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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
over appeals from a number of administrative bodies, as well as subjectspecific appeals from all U.S. district courts.1 Two significant areas of
appeal from district courts are patent law and trade law.2 The Federal
Circuit consists of twelve judges, whom the President appoints and the
Senate confirms to lifetime terms. In this Article of the Federal Circuit
Symposium issue, I will be examining key cases the Federal Circuit heard
* Ph.D., George Mason University; J.D., M.A., American University; B.A., Lock Haven
University. Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Irvin Gross Research Fellow at
Temple University. Professor Fandl is also the former Chief of Staff for International
Trade and Intellectual Property at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s
International Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Center. The author would like
to thank the editorial staff at the American University Law Review for their outstanding
work on this piece.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012).
2. § 1295(a)(4)–(7).
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on appeal from the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT). These cases
typically involve matters of antidumping and countervailing duty
(AD/CVD) law, customs classification, and the origin of imported goods.
I will begin with an examination of classification cases.
I. CLASSIFICATION
A key element in international trade is the identification of goods
being imported. Without the ability to identify a good, customs officers
could not properly classify a good, determine whether any restrictions
apply to it, and decide what tariff, if any, they should apply. The latter
issue is of great significance to importers, who generally want to avoid
excessive tariffs on certain goods.
Consider the famous 2005 case, Conair Corp. v. United States,3 which
involved the import of simulated desktop waterfalls, also known as
“Serenity Ponds.”4 The importer, Conair, classified these devices as
“[p]umps for liquids,”5 which carried a 0% tariff rate. Upon review,
Customs decided that the devices should be classified as “[o]ther
articles of plastics,”6 which carried a tariff rate of 5.3%. The central
question in the case was: what are these devices? The CIT ultimately
decided that because the water pump was the essential element that
made these plastic devices transform into “Serenity Ponds,” they
should be classified as water pumps.7 The decision likely saved Conair
millions of dollars in potential tariffs.
Classification in the United States is based upon the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule, which is maintained by the World Customs
Organization and to which more than 170 members abide. This
schedule provides classifications for nearly every good in existence,
though defining the nature of a particular good is often a complex
process that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) performs
upon the entry of the imported goods. Likewise, importers are no
strangers to this process and can often use “tariff engineering” to avert
certain tariffs. For instance, while the import of garlic powder carries
a high tariff, blending that powder with 1% onion powder converts the
good into a “vegetable blend,” subjecting it to a lower tariff.

3. 29 Ct. Int’l Trade 888 (2005).
4. Id. at 888–89.
5. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES
(2020), USITC Pub. 5011, subheading 8413.70.2004 (Jan. 2020).
6. Id. at subheading 3926.40.00.
7. Conair Corp., 29 Ct. Int’l Trade at 899.
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This Article’s first section will highlight some of the key classification
cases that were appealed to Federal Circuit and in the process, explain
some key classification rules that the Federal Circuit helped to clarify
this term. We begin with a case involving the nature of doorknobs.
Doorknobs are useful tools to allow entry into a home. But they are also
useful to help us understand the classification of goods in the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). These seemingly
straightforward pieces of hardware were the subject of Home Depot v. United
States,8 which the Federal Circuit decided in February 2019.9
The Home Depot case was a challenge to CBP’s classification of
imported doorknobs with integral locks. CBP initially classified these
products as locks under heading 8301 of the HTSUS, carrying a tariff
of 5.7% ad valorem.10 Home Depot argued that the locks should have
been classified as metal fittings for doors under heading 8302 of the
HTSUS, carrying a tariff of 3.9% ad valorem.11
Heading 8301, in relevant part, reads as follows: “Door locks, locksets
and other locks suitable for use with interior or exterior doors (except
garage, overhead or sliding doors).”12
Heading 8302, in relevant part, reads as follows:
Base metal mountings, fittings and similar articles suitable for
furniture, doors, staircases, windows, blinds, coachwork, saddlery,
trunks, chests, caskets or the like; base metal hat racks, hat-pegs,
brackets and similar fixtures; castors with mountings of base metal;
automatic door closers of base metal; and base metal parts thereof:
[o]ther mountings, fittings and similar articles, and parts thereof . . .
[o]f iron or steel, of aluminum or of zinc . . . [s]uitable for interior
and exterior doors (except garage, overhead or sliding doors).13

Though both headings seem to be broad enough to include the
subject merchandise, the question for the Federal Circuit was how to
determine which heading was most appropriate. In cases like these, the
Federal Circuit (and CBP) turns to the General Rules of Interpretation
(GRI), which provide guidance in understanding the HTSUS.
The CIT agreed with CBP’s classification determination, finding that
heading 8301 wholly described the subject doorknobs. The CIT found
that heading 8302 also describes the goods, but that heading 8301 does
8. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 915 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
9. Id. at 1376.
10. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1306, 1308 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2017), vacated, 915 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
11. Id. at 1308.
12. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at subheading 8301.40.6030.
13. Id. at subheading 8302.41.60.
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so more completely. Whereas heading 8302 would include doorknobs,
the subject merchandise was in fact locksets with keyed entry systems,
making them a more complex product better described by heading
8301.14 The Federal Circuit disagreed.
The GRIs help determine proper HTSUS headings and subheadings
to resolve classification disputes. The GRIs have four basic rules:
1. GRI 1 controls imported articles that a single classification
heading or subheading describes.15
2. GRI 2(a) explains that the any heading covering a complete
article will also cover an incomplete or unfinished article, as long as
the unfinished article has the “essential character” of the complete
article.16 GRI 2(a) explains that the any heading covering a complete
article will also cover an incomplete or unfinished article, as long as
the unfinished article has the “essential character” of the complete
article.17 GRI 2(b) simply states that relevant parties should classify
imported articles comprised of multiple materials or substances
according to the tripartite GRI 3, which governs goods within the scope
of multiple materials or substances according to the tripartite GRI 3,
which governs goods within the scope of multiple headings.18
3. GRI 3(a) instructs those classifying goods that fall under
multiple headings to defer to the most specific description.19 However,
when multiple headings refer to only part of the materials and
substances contained in a composite good, those headings are equally
specific relative to that good.20 If 3(a) does not apply to a given composite
good, 3(b) directs parties to classify that good as if the composite only
contained the material or component that gives the composite its
essential character.21 When neither 3(a) nor 3(b) applies to a composite
good, 3(c) instructs parties to classify the good under the heading that
occurs last numerically among equally applicable headings.22

14. Home Depot, 915 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Home Depot, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1314) (“A
lock, the court added, ‘is a multi-component device, of which one component is a
lever. In some types of locks, the lever is a door knob.’”).
15. CamelBak Prods., L.L.C. v. United States, 649 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
16. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, General Rules of Interpretation 2(a).
17. Id.
18. Id. General Rules of Interpretation 2(b).
19. Home Depot, 915 F.3d at 1380.
20. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, General Rules of Interpretation 3(a).
21. Id. General Rules of Interpretation 3(b).
22. Id. General Rules of Interpretation 3(c).
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4. Per GRI 4, relevant parties should classify goods that do not fall
within the scope of the preceding rules under the heading
corresponding to the most similar goods.23
Applying the GRI, the Federal Circuit found that neither heading
captured the whole product appropriately.24 Heading 8301 describes
door locks, whereas heading 8302 describes doorknobs.25 As the
subject merchandise is both a doorknob and a door lock, GRI 1
stipulates that neither heading is dispositive in the classification
process because both headings only describe part of the good.26
Having concluded that neither heading is dispositive due to lack of
completeness, the Federal Circuit moved on to consider GRI 2, which
focuses instead on the essential character of the good. “Essential
character” typically refers to the principal use of the product—the reason
consumers might demand it, for instance.27 In the 2005 case, Conair v.
United States, the subject merchandise was a desktop waterfall, and the
classification dispute was whether the water pump that moved water
through the device or the plastic parts that comprised the actual waterfall
constituted the waterfall’s essential character.28 In that case, the element
that determined the essential character was the water pump, without
which the waterfall would be nothing more than a piece of plastic.29
The Federal Circuit concluded in the Home Depot case that GRI 3(b)
was the appropriate rule for classifying the imported locksets there.30
The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the CIT to determine the
essential character of the locksets.31
In the second classification case during the Federal Circuit’s last
term, the court again relied upon the GRIs to uphold a lower court
decision classifying fiberoptic telecommunication devices. ADC
Telecommunications, Inc. v. United States32 involved a challenge to CBP’s
classification of such equipment under HTSUS heading 9013 (“other

23. Id. General Rules of Interpretation 4.
24. Home Depot, 915 F.3d at 1380.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1378–80; see U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, General Rules of
Interpretation 1.
27. See Estee Lauder, Inc. v. United States, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1300 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2012); Structural Indus., Inc. v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1336 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2005); Conair Corp. v. United States, 29 Ct. Int’l Trade 888, 895 (2005).
28. Conair Corp., 29 Ct. Int’l Trade at 895–96 (2005).
29. Id. at 896–97.
30. Home Depot, 915 F.3d at 1380.
31. Id. at 1381.
32. 916 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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optical appliances and instruments, not specified or included
elsewhere in this chapter”).33 The equipment in question includes
connectors on the ends of fiberoptic cables that allow installation
without the need to splice the cable.
ADC argued that the imported fiberoptic modules should have been
classified under heading 8517 (“other apparatus for the transmission
or reception of voice, images or other data, including apparatus for
communication in a wired or wireless network (such as a local or wide
area network)”), which bears no duty.34 The original classification
includes a duty rate of 4.5% ad valorem.35 The key question in this case
was whether the modules are prima facie classifiable under the
subheading CBP relied on, in which case there would be no need to
consider a more specific classification.
The GRIs are used when more than one heading could potentially
describe subject imports. A court will apply the GRIs in chronological
order, “meaning that subsequent rules are inapplicable if a preceding
rule provides proper classification.”36 The first GRI states that
“classification shall be determined according to the terms of the
headings and any relative section or chapter notes.”37 These headings
are examined without regard to the subheadings therein.38
Here, the Federal Circuit turned to technical and general
dictionaries to aid in defining the meaning of optical devices. The
Federal Circuit found that the 9013 heading simply required that the
subject merchandise be primarily used for transmitting data through
the use of light.39 The CIT agreed with ADC that the subject
merchandise could also be classified under heading 8517; however,
that heading differentiates products on the basis of physical
characteristics rather than the use of the cables (i.e., the transmission
of data).40 Also, as heading 8517 specifically excludes any product
classified by heading 9013, and as the Federal Circuit confirmed that
the modules should be classified under heading 9013, the modules
could not fall within heading 8517.41
33. Id. at 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2019); U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at
subheading 9013.
34. ADC Telecomm., 916 F.3d 1013 at 1015.
35. Id.
36. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. United States, 845 F.3d 1158, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
37. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, General Rules of Interpretation 1.
38. See R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
39. See ADC Telecomm., 916 F.3d at 1019, 1021.
40. Id. at 1021.
41. Id. at 1022–23.
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Finally, the Federal Circuit applied GRI 6, which requires that, once
a good has been classified under a particular heading, the first four
GRIs would be reapplied to determine the appropriate subheading
under that heading.42 Applying that rule of interpretation, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the subject merchandise did not fall within any
of the defined subheadings.43 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
classified the goods in the “other” category.44
Most classification cases involve disputes over very small details
within target goods. For example, in Irwin Industrial Tool Co. v. United
States,45 the Federal Circuit determined whether the target imports
were pliers or wrenches.46 The CBP sought to classify the goods as
wrenches under heading 8204.12.00, which carries a 9% duty, whereas
the importer sought to classify the goods as pliers under 8203.20.60,
which carries a duty of $0.12 per dozen plus 5.5%.47
The unique contribution of this case during the 2019 term is the
discussion of when to apply an eo nomine interpretation and when to
limit a definition by use. When applying eo nominee interpretation, a
term is considered to include all possible definitions and forms and is
not limited by use.48 When limiting a definition by use, a term can be
defined by how the good is used in practice.49 The Federal Circuit
reiterates that “a use limitation should not be read into an eo nomine
provision unless the name itself inherently suggests a type of use.”50
In the Irwin case, CBP attempted to define the term “wrench” as eo
nomine, but defined “pliers” by their use, which it found to be “pincers
with two handles and jaws adapted for manipulating small objects or
for bending and shaping wire, sometimes including a wire cutter, and
whose grasp is dependent upon maintaining continuous hand
pressure.”51 CBP’s chosen dictionary definition for “wrench,” on the

42. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, General Rules of Interpretation 6. Note
that GRIs I–IV apply in order until one of the rules fits the particular situation. GRIs V
and VI apply independently as needed; see, e.g., Orlando Food Corp. v. United States,
140 F.3d 1437, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
43. ADC Telecomm., 916, F.3d at 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
44. Id.; see U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at subheading 9013.80.9000.
45. Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. United States, 920 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
46. Id. at 1357–58.
47. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at subheading 8203.20.6030.
48. Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting
Hayes-Sammons Chem. Co. v. United States, 55 C.C.P.A. 69, 75 (1968)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 920 F.3d at 1358–59.
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other hand, referred to tools “used for holding, twisting, or turning a
bolt, nut, screwhead, pipe or other object.”52 With these definitions in
hand, CBP classified Irwin’s goods, which included “straight jaw
locking pliers, large jaw locking pliers, curved jaw locking pliers with
and without wire cutters, and long nose locking pliers with wire
cutters,” as wrenches.53 CBP went on to state that “locking tools should
not be included in the definition of pliers because the primary purpose
of a locking mechanism is to permit the maximum application of torque,
which is the function of a wrench.”54
Irwin countered CBP’s use-based definition of “wrenches” and
argued that they should be defined eo nomine. Irwin made the point
that if the CIT accepted CBP’s definition, the CIT would have to
classify a crowbar as a wrench since the use of a crowbar is “to permit
the maximum application of torque.”55 The CIT agreed with Irwin and
applied dictionary definitions to both goods.56
The Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that the term “wrench” is an eo
nomine term not limited by use.57 The Federal Circuit noted that some
wrenches and pliers are created for specific purposes; however, these
exceptions are not a reasonable basis to limit the definition of the object
itself to those specified uses.58 Applying these eo nomine definitions, the
Federal Circuit agreed that the target goods were properly classified as
pliers.59 As the next case indicates, these ambiguous classification
distinctions can result in significant unexpected expenses for companies.
Christmas became a little more costly for Rubie’s Costume Company
thanks to the Federal Circuit’s decision on Santa costumes.60 This case,
Rubies Costume Co. v. United States,61 addressed the question of what
makes a costume a festive article rather than fancy dress of textile
material. The subject good was a nine-piece Santa suit, consisting of
jacket, pants, hat, and all of the accoutrements typical of the
character.62 The items were classified in different subheadings across
chapters 61 and 62, which cover fancy dress and carry higher duty
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1359 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1358–59.
Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1361.
Id.
Id. at 1360.
Rubies Costume Co. v. United States, 922 F.3d 1337, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
922 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1340.
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rates.63 Rubie’s argued that the goods should enter duty-free as festive
articles under chapter 95.64
This case was not the first time that the Federal Circuit addressed
the definition of costumes. Rubie’s was party to a 2003 Federal Circuit
decision addressing the importation and classification of Halloween
costumes.65 In that case, Rubie’s asserted that the costumes should be
classified as festive articles under chapter 95; however, the court pointed
out that Note 1(e) to that chapter excludes “fancy dress, of textiles of
chapter 61 or 62,” from chapter 95.66 The Federal Circuit in that case
defined “fancy dress” to include costumes that are wearable as apparel.67
Following the first Rubies Costume Co. v. United States68 decision in
2003, CBP went on to issue an Informed Compliance Publication
(ICP), which distinguished flimsy, nondurable costumes that would
qualify for classification under chapter 95 from well-made, normal
wearing apparel that would qualify for classification under chapters 61
and 62.69 CBP applied this guidance to the Santa suit in the more recent
case and determined that the high-quality manufacture of the suit,
including the “woven satin fabric lining” of the jacket that is suitable for
dry cleaning and multiple uses, the acrylic and polyester pants with
hemmed pockets, the 100% polyester knit gloves, and so forth, excluded
the Santa suit from chapter 95 because it qualified as “fancy dress.”70
The CIT agreed with the interpretation by CBP and denied Rubie’s
motion for summary judgment.71 The Federal Circuit likewise agreed
and clarified that “fancy dress” is not limited to apparel that one would
wear on a regular basis, but rather that it could include a well-made
costume that one could wear multiple times due to its quality
construction.72 The CIT correctly called these costumes “well-made” and

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1341.
Id.
Rubies Costume Co. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1350, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1352, 1356.
Rubies Costume Co., 922 F.3d at 1345.
337 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, WHAT
EVERY MEMBER OF THE TRADE COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW ABOUT: CLASSIFICATION OF
TEXTILE COSTUMES UNDER THE HTSUS 10 (2008), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/icp077_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/JFD7-M6K6].
70. Rubies Costume Co., 922 F.3d at 1345.
71. Id. at 1341.
72. Id. at 1345.
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able to survive several holiday seasons, thereby relieving the costumes of
their festive article status and turning them into fancy dress.73
The Federal Circuit had an opportunity to apply its reasoning from
Rubies right away in a case dealing with sausage casings imported from
Germany.74 In Kalle USA, Inc. v. United States,75 the importer sought to
classify its casings, which consist of textile covering coated with a layer
of plastic on one side, as plastics under chapter 39 of the HTSUS,
which carry a duty rate of 3.1%.76 CBP chose to classify them as “madeup textiles” under chapter 63 with a duty rate of 7%.77
The key issue in Kalle was how to define the term “completely
embedded” in plastics as it is used in chapter 59 of the HTSUS. The
Federal Circuit explained that the HTSUS does not allow a good to be
classifiable under two separate headings when there are mutually
exclusive rules in those headings.78 In this case, the rules are found in
chapter 39 and section XI, which encompasses chapters 59 and 63.
Note 1(h) of section XI stipulates that fabrics that are “impregnated,
coated, covered or laminated with plastics” are covered by chapter 39
and are excluded from section XI.79 Note 2(p) of chapter 39 excludes
textile goods from section XI from chapter 39.80 In Kalle, the Federal
Circuit addressed whether the subject imports were “completely
embedded” in plastics, as “completely embedded” is used under
chapter 59 of the HTSUS.
The Federal Circuit applied the common definition of “completely
embedded” and found that the plastic would have to be “set or fix[ed]
firmly in a surrounding mass.”81 The Federal Circuit concluded that
“for a textile to be completely embedded in plastic, it must be entirely
firmly fixed in the plastic.”82 Following the logic of Rubies, the Federal
Circuit reasoned that the exclusionary rules must be read in context to
understand why they were included in the HTSUS in the first place.83

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1345–46.
Kalle USA, Inc. v. United States, 923 F.3d 991, 995 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
923 F.3d 991 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at subheading 3917.39.0050.
Id. at subheading 6307.90.98.
Kalle USA, 923 F.3d at 994.
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, § XI n.1(h).
Id. at ch. 39 n.2(p).
Kalle USA, 923 F.3d at 995 (quoting Embedded, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY, 442–43 (3d coll. ed. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id. (quoting Kalle USA, Inc. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1333 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2017)).
83. Id. at 996.
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Here, the court suggested that the drafters wanted to make a
distinction between fabrics that are impregnated with plastic and those
that are completely embedded in plastics.84 While this does not mean
that the fabric must have plastic on all sides, it does have to be fixed in
a surrounding mass of plastic.85
Continuing with the line of discussion about eo nomine versus use
provisions in the HTSUS, the Federal Circuit used a single-entry case
brought by Ford Motor Company to explain when use can be
considered even in an eo nomine term.86 In Ford Motor Co. v. United
States,87 Ford imported a van suitable for either passengers or cargo,
depending on the interior layout of the van.88 When defined as a cargo
van, the vehicle is subject to a 25% tariff.89 As a passenger van, the tariff
would be only 2.5%.90
The subject vehicles were imported with a second row of seats,
making them both appropriate for passengers and, in the opinion of the
CIT, classifiable as passenger vans.91 However, after importation but
before leaving the port, Ford removed the rear seats and plugged the
holes to make the vans suitable for cargo.92 The actual or intended use
would normally be considered for HTSUS terms that are not eo nomine.
Generally, “a use limitation should not be read into an eo nomine
provision.”93 However, the Federal Circuit notes that when the definition
itself suggests a “type of use,” the usage should not be ignored.94
The CIT determined that the HTSUS definition of the subject
vehicles was eo nomine; thus, consideration of the use of the vehicle
was unnecessary in the CIT’s analysis.95 The Federal Circuit provided
examples of fact patterns that would require a court to look beyond
the definition itself and examine the use of the good. For instance, for
a handbag to be classified as a “vanity case,” its primary use would have
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 926 F.3d 741, 753 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
87. 926 F.3d 741 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
88. See generally id. at 745–47 (explaining how Ford converted the passenger vans
into cargo vans after importation).
89. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at subheading 8704.31.00.
90. Id. at subheading 8703.23.01.
91. Ford Motor Co., 926 F.3d at 748.
92. Id. at 747.
93. Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
94. Id.; see also GRK Can., Ltd. v. United States, 761 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (reaffirming this approach).
95. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1332 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2017), rev’d, 926 F.3d 741 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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to be to hold cosmetics.96 Similarly, for the definition of “other wood
screws” to apply, the primary use would have to be to fasten wood.97
Referencing the precedent set in Marubeni America Corp. v. United
States,98 the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT and found that when use
is implied in an eo nomine term, the actual or intended use can be
considered when classifying the goods.99
II. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES
One of the most active areas of defensive trade law in the United States
is the area of antidumping and countervailing duties. Both of these
defenses to imports arose in the Tariff Act of 1930, which specifies that the
United States may impose duties on imports to “provide relief from market
distortions caused by foreign producers who sell their merchandise in the
United States for less than fair market value” (antidumping) or “to address
government subsidies to foreign producers” (countervailing duties).100
Each of these defenses must be justified by an investigation which, today, is
conducted by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), an
independent body that works with the Department of Commerce
(Commerce) to assess material injury.
To determine whether an exporter is dumping a product in the
United States, Commerce first conducts its own investigation to assess
whether an imported good is being sold in the United States below fair
market value and, if so, by how much (i.e., the dumping margin).
Simultaneously, the USITC assesses:
(1) whether there is a “reasonable indication” that an industry is
materially injured or is threatened with material injury, or (2)
whether the establishment of an industry is materially retarded, by
reason of imports under investigation by the Department of
Commerce that are allegedly sold at less than fair value in the United
States or subsidized.101

To counter dumping, the United States conducts investigations to
assess whether and to what extent an exporter is dumping an imported
96. Ford Motor Co., 926 F.3d at 751 (citing Len-Ron Mfg. Co. v. United States, 334
F.3d 1304, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
97. Id. (citing GRK, 761 F.3d at 1359).
98. 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
99. See id. at 534–35 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Ford Motor Co., 926 F.3d at 754 (“The
subject merchandise is not principally designed for the transport of persons.”).
100. Bell Supply Co. v. United States, 888 F.3d 1222, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(referring to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (2012)).
101. Understanding Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Investigations, U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/usad.htm [https://perma.cc/5 PFL-PL4L].
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product and, where appropriate, levy an additional duty on that imported
good to offset the cost differential between the good’s fair market value
and its sales price. According to § 1673 in Title 19 of the U.S. Code, any
imported good sold or likely to be sold on “the United States [market] at
less than its fair value” may qualify for an antidumping duty.102
A. Calculating the Dumping Margin
The dumping margin for subject merchandise is calculated by
subtracting the price of the imported good in the export market from the
price of the good in the United States—the “export price.”103 The process
for calculating the dumping margin is outlined in § 1673 of the
Countervailing and Antidumping duties under Title 19 of the U.S.
Code,104 which stipulates the following steps:
1. Commerce determines the “export price” (the price paid by the
first unaffiliated buyer in the United States) of the target merchandise;105
2. Commerce determines the “normal value” (the price sold in the
exporting market) of the target merchandise;106
3. If the export price is lower than the normal value, Commerce sets
the duty rate at the difference between the two prices;107
4. Finally, Commerce establishes the “dumping margin” by using the
weighted average of all targeted exporters.108
Despite this relatively straightforward-sounding process, in practice, the
calculation is much more complicated. The export price is determined in
one of two ways. First, it may reflect the price at which the subject
merchandise is sold or the price at which it is agreed to be sold prior to
importation by the foreign producer to an unaffiliated buyer in or
exporter to the United States.109 This is known as the “export price.”
However, if the first sale is not to an unaffiliated buyer or exporter,
Commerce must determine the “constructed export price.”110 This
second method takes the price of the first sale to the affiliated buyer
or exporter and adjusts it based upon a number of specified criteria.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

§ 1673.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
19 U.S.C. § 1673.
§ 1677a(a).
§ 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i).
§ 1673.
§ 1677(35).
§ 1677a(a).
§ 1677a(b).
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Among the criteria by which the constructed export price is adjusted
are expenses incurred by the producer or exporter. These expenses
include sales commissions, warranties and credit expenses, selling
expenses the seller pays on behalf of the purchaser, costs related to
further manufacture in the United States, and associated profit.111
Commerce deducts these expenses from the sales price, thus
increasing the dumping margin.
As discussed above, the dumping margin is calculated by subtracting
the export price or the constructed export price from the “normal
value,” which is the price the good is sold for in the exporting
market.112 The normal value is determined by calculating the sale price
for the product in the exporting country where it is first sold (or
offered for sale) for consumption within that country. This valuation
method assumes the supply, channel of trade, and volume of trade is
consistent with those of the importing country.113 The statute also
specifies a number of adjustments that can offset this price.114
After investigating power transformer imports from Korea at the
request of domestic producers, including ABB Inc., Commerce
imposed an antidumping duty on those imports in 2012.115 Hyundai
was a mandatory respondent in that investigation. Hyundai’s first sales
were to a seller affiliated with Hyundai. Accordingly, Commerce used
the constructed export price method to determine the sales price of
the target goods.116
In ABB, Inc. v. United States,117 referred to as the Hyundai case, the
main issue revolved around how to calculate a commission adjustment
when the commission is paid on U.S. sales but not on foreign sales.118
The Federal Circuit found that Commerce properly reduced the
constructed export price by the amount of the U.S. sales
commission;119 however, Hyundai contended that Commerce failed to
adjust the normal value with a commission offset.120 The Federal
111. § 1677a(d)(1)–(3).
112. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i).
113. Id.
114. § 1677b(a)(6)(A)–(C).
115. See Large Power Transformers from the Republic of Korea: Preliminary
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Postponement of Final
Determination, 77 Fed. Reg. 9204, 9204 (Feb. 16, 2012).
116. Id. at 9207.
117. 920 F.3d 811 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
118. Id. at 812–13.
119. Id. at 817.
120. Id. at 815.
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Circuit agreed with the CIT in finding Commerce’s justification for not
providing a commission offset reasonable.121 Commerce stated that it
only offsets a commission (i.e., reduces the normal value by that
amount) when the seller pays those commissions in the home market
or outside the United States.122 In the case of commissions paid only in
the United States, Commerce reduces those amounts from the export
price or constructed export price, as it did in this case.123
B. Determination of Origin
In order to measure the difference in value from the foreign market
to the U.S. market, Commerce must determine two things: first, it must
classify the imports to ensure that it is valuing the correct good under
investigation, and; second, it must determine from where the good was
shipped—its origin.124 The origin of the good is typically determined
by identifying the location in which it was manufactured or
processed.125 However, in cases in which the good was pieced together
or transformed in more than one country, Commerce typically follows
the substantial transformation test.126
The substantial transformation test enables Commerce to determine
whether a good changed origin on the basis of processing in a country
other than its first point of origin.127 If a product is manufactured in one
country but assembled in another, that product “loses its identity and is
transformed into a new product having a new name, character and use.”128
This term, the Federal Circuit heard a case that dealt with an
application of a test other than the substantial information test during
an AD/CVD investigation.129 The case, Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United
States,130 involved solar panels imported from China and began with a
2011 investigation spawned by a petition from a domestic solar panel

121. Id. at 826.
122. Id. at 825–26.
123. Id.
124. Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Market Value: Certain ColdRolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Argentina, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,062, 37,065 (July 9, 1993).
125. See id. at 37,065.
126. See id. (explaining “substantial transformation” refers to the degree to which a
product is processed or manufactured in a country to be deemed a product of that country).
127. Id.
128. Bell Supply Co. v. United States, 888 F.3d 1222, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
Bestfoods v. United States, 165 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
129. Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.3d 909, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
130. 918 F.3d 909 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

1316

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1301

manufacturer, SolarWorld.131 In that case, Commerce concluded that
because the solar cells can be manufactured in China but assembled
elsewhere, or manufactured elsewhere but assembled in China, it
should apply the substantial transformation test to assess the imports’
origin.132 Its conclusion was based upon the determination that the
component giving origin was the solar cell, not the assembly of the
solar panels.133 A similar case involving imports from Taiwan resulted
in the same finding.134
However, in a second investigation of those cells, SolarWorld alleged
that China circumvented its duties by assembling panels using only
non-Chinese cells.135 During the investigation, Commerce accordingly
chose to depart from the substantial transformation test and instead
applied the “country of assembly test.”136 Commerce justified its
departure from the standard test of origin for the following reasons: (1)
the solar panel industry is unique because of its adaptable supply chain,
thus allowing trade to easily shift in the fact of an AD/CVD order; (2) the
scope language of the first AD/CVD order is neither administrable nor
enforceable; and (3) Commerce needed a workable mechanism to
determine injury in lieu of the substantial transformation test.137
Petitioners in the original antidumping order case, SunPower Corp. v.
United States,138 contended that Commerce’s new test of origin “was
inconsistent with the agency’s prior practice for determining country
of origin in similar proceedings, and departed from that practice
without sufficient explanation.”139 The CIT agreed with the petitioners
and found that Commerce departed from its prior practice without
providing an ample justification for doing so.140 On remand,
Commerce stated that it has broad discretion to apply the test it
believes is most appropriate in an investigation.141 Commerce also
131. Id. at 912, 914; see also Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not
Assembled into Modules, from the People’s Republic of China: Amended Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, and Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed.
Reg. 73,018 (Dec. 7, 2012).
132. SunPower Corp. v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1279 n.3 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2017).
133. Id. at 1278–79, 1279 n.3.
134. Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from Taiwan: Antidumping
Duty Order, 80 Fed. Reg. 8596, 8596 (Feb. 18, 2015).
135. Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 914–15.
136. Id. at 915.
137. Id. (citing SunPower, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 1283).
138. 179 F. Supp. 3d 1286 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016).
139. SunPower, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 1283.
140. SunPower, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1288–89.
141. Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 915–16.
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stated that the products at issue were distinct, since every investigation
creates a new class of products.142 Finally, Commerce explained that it
needed a test that would consider the role of China, which had
allegedly been evading prior investigations and undermining the basis
for AD/CVD duties.143
The CIT upheld Commerce’s second determination and found its
justification reasonable.144 Petitioners appealed to the Federal Circuit. On
appeal, the Federal Circuit reiterated the deference it provides to
Commerce in its interpretation of the Tariff Act, which did not specify how
Commerce determines the class of goods to be investigated.145 In addition,
this authority encompasses Commerce’s ability to determine country of
origin.146 The only caveat is that Commerce must justify its reasoning if it
decides to shift from one standard to another, as it did here.147
The Federal Circuit reviewed Commerce’s justification for departing
from its previous policy to practice to another using the arbitrary or
capricious standard, which asks whether the explanation of Commerce
reflects reasoned decision making.148 “[A]n explanation is reasoned if
Commerce demonstrates that ‘the new policy is permissible under the
statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes
it to be better.’”149 Here, the Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that
Commerce made a reasonable decision to depart from the prior
practice of substantial transformation in this case and that it had
adequate reason to do so.150
C. Procedures for and Exceptions to AD/CVD Orders
A significant and controversial element to the AD/CVD
investigation process is the determination that an exporting country is
a nonmarket economy (“NME”). If Commerce determines that the
exporting country is indeed an NME, the calculation of the dumping
margin changes on the assumption that the sales price in that
142. Id. at 916.
143. Id.
144. SunPower, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 1288.
145. Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 917; see also SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d
1022, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (allowing agencies to interpret their authority when a
statute, such as in this case, is silent on the matter).
146. Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 917 (citing Bell Supply Co. v. United States, 888
F.3d 1222, 1228–29 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
147. Id. at 917
148. Id.
149. Id. at 918 (citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)).
150. Id. at 920.
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exporting country would not reflect the fair market value.151
Accordingly, Commerce and the USITC turn to a market economy at
a similar level of economic development, and they rely upon the
“factors of production” used in making a comparable product in that
country.152 Commerce must value the factors of production “to the
extent possible . . . in one or more market economy countries that
are—(A) at a level of economic development comparable to that of the
nonmarket economy country, and (B) significant producers of
comparable merchandise.”153 The resulting value is known as the
“surrogate value” of the goods.154
Upon determining that dumping has or will occur, Commerce is
instructed to publish an antidumping duty order that directs CBP to
collect the duty for the imports subject to the investigation.155 The order
remains in place indefinitely; however, due to a change in law following
passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act156 in 1995, Commerce
and the USITC are required to conduct antidumping duty administrative
reviews every five years to determine whether the order should be
modified or eliminated.157 These are known as “sunset reviews.”158
In addition to the sunset reviews, Commerce and the USITC are
required to conduct annual administrative reviews of orders upon
request by interested parties.159
Lastly, Commerce and the USITC are required to conduct an
administrative review when a petitioner claims to be a “new shipper”
that was not exporting the subject goods at the time of the original
dumping investigation.160 In these cases, Commerce is required to
determine an individual weighted average for each of the known

151. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (2012).
152. § 1677b(c)(1).
153. § 1677b(c)(4).
154. See, e.g., Jacobi Carbons AB v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1352 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2018) (“When an antidumping duty proceeding involves a nonmarket economy
country, Commerce determines normal value by valuing the factors of production in a
surrogate country . . . and those values are referred to as ‘surrogate values.’”).
155. § 1673e(a).
156. § 3511.
157. § 1675(c).
158. 19 C.F.R. § 351.218 (2019).
159. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1).
160. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(i); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.214(a) (2019).
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exporters of the subject merchandise.161 This is a process that has been
subject to abuse in the past.162
The calculation of dumping margins for exporters in NMEs and
exceptions for new shippers appeared in Weishan Hongda Aquatic Food
Co. v. United States (China Kingdom).163 In that case, Commerce
conducted an administrative review of a dumping order that had been
in effect since 1997 on exports of crawfish tail meat from China.164 The
2014 review utilized data from the two largest exporters, China
Kingdom and Deyan, while Ocean Flavor joined as a voluntary
participant.165 Additionally, Commerce combined this administrative
review with new shipper reviews for three companies, including
Weishan Hongda Aquatic Food Co. (Hongda).166
Given that China was treated as an NME in this review, Commerce
selected six countries that it believed would be adequate surrogate
countries—South Africa, Colombia, Bulgaria, Thailand, Ecuador and
Indonesia.167 Following Commerce’s “regulatory preference” to value
factors of production from a single country, Commerce chose to use only
Thailand as the surrogate for China.168 The factors of production that
Commerce evaluated were: (1) manufacturing overhead; (2) selling,
general, and administrative expenses; and (3) profit as determined by
reviewing nonproprietary information on financial statements.169
Relying on data from two Thai companies, Commerce determined
that the weighted average dumping margin for each of the Chinese
exporters was 0.0%.170 However, when Commerce issued its final report

161. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f–1(c)(1).
162. See generally Kevin J. Fandl, Promoting International Business Development While
Protecting Domestic Markets: An Analysis of the New Shipper Review Policy of the United States,
36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 605, 606, 614–18 (2005).
163. Weishan Hongda Aquatic Food Co. v. United States (China Kingdom) 917 F.3d
1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
164. Id.; see also Notice of Amendment to Final Determination of Sales at Less Than
Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat from the
People’s Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 48,218, 48,219 (Sept. 15, 1997).
165. See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews,
79 Fed. Reg. 64,565, 64,567–68 (Oct. 30, 2014).
166. See Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat from the People’s Republic of China: Initiation
of Antidumping New Shipper Reviews, 79 Fed. Reg. 64,749, 64,749 (Oct. 31, 2014).
167. China Kingdom, 917 F.3d at 1359.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.; see also Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat from the People’s Republic of China:
Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and New Shipper
Returns, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,624, 60,625 (Oct. 7, 2015).
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shortly thereafter, the Thai financial statements were eliminated in
favor of financial statements from the South African company, Oceana
Group.171 Commerce contended that the Thai exporters had benefited
from government subsidies, making their financial statements no
longer valid for comparison.172 The new calculation led to dumping
margins of 22.16% for China Kingdom, 12.04% for Deyan and 17.23%
for Ocean Flavor.173
The CIT agreed with Commerce’s findings and decision to rely on a
second surrogate country after determining that some of the data from
the first surrogate had become potentially inaccurate.174 The exporter
appealed to the Federal Circuit and argued that Commerce incorrectly
disregarded the financial reports from the Thai producers.175
Conversely, the Crawfish Processors Alliance, a domestic interested
party, argued that the CIT lacked jurisdiction to hear the case in the
first instance. The Crawfish Processor Alliance contended that the
foreign exporters failed to exhaust their administrative remedies
because they failed to raise the objection to the Oceana financial
statements during the administrative review.176
The Federal Circuit’s analysis in the China Kingdom case yields two
valuable takeaways. First, it states that exhaustion of remedies by a
petitioner is not required in the absence of a statute mandating such
exhaustion.177 A petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies “where
Congress imposes an exhaustion requirement by statute.”178 “But where
Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion
governs.”179 The Court clarified that the exhaustion requirement is not
jurisdictional, meaning that failure to exhaust administrative remedies
does not necessarily cause a lack of jurisdiction.180

171. China Kingdom, 917 F.3d at 1360.
172. Id.
173. Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat from the People’s Republic of China: Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and New Shipper Returns, 81 Fed.
Reg. 21,840, 21,841 (Apr. 13, 2016).
174. Weishan Hongda Aquatic Food Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 3d. 1279,
1292–93 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2017), aff’d, 917 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
175. China Kingdom, 917 F.3d at 1361.
176. Id. at 1361–62.
177. Id. at 1363.
178. Id. (quoting Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S.
561, 579 (1989)).
179. Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)).
180. Id. (“We clarify that the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies under
§ 2637(d) is not jurisdictional.”).
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Second, the Court concluded that Commerce did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting the Thai financial statements in favor of the
South Africa equivalents.181 The Federal Circuit reiterated that
Commerce has “broad discretion” in determining what constitutes the
best available information for their administrative reviews.182 In this
case, Commerce determined that the Thai companies were receiving
export subsidies that affected their financial statements.183 The Trade
Preferences Extension Act of 2015184 clearly states that, “[i]n valuing
the factors of production,” Commerce “may disregard price or cost
values without further investigation if [Commerce] has determined
that broadly available export subsidies existed or particular instances
of subsidization occurred.”185 Given the substantial evidence that the
Thai companies received subsidies under Thailand’s Investment
Promotion Act, the Court concluded that Commerce acted reasonably
in disregarding those statements.186
Another avenue that parties have to seek relief from an AD/CVD order
is through a “scope ruling.” A scope ruling is a petition to Commerce to
determine whether a particular good should be covered under an existing
AD/CVD order or whether it can be excluded.187 Commerce is authorized
to determine “whether a particular type of merchandise is within the class
or kind of merchandise described in an existing finding of dumping or
antidumping or countervailing duty order.”188
The procedure adopted for scope rulings has been published as a
regulation.189 An “interested party” initiates the investigation by
petitioning the Secretary of Commerce (the “Secretary”) and
presenting its case for why a given product should be excluded from
an existing AD/CVD order.190 The Secretary is required to issue a
ruling within forty-five days of receipt.191 In complex cases, the
Secretary may issue a preliminary ruling, conduct a more thorough
investigation, and then issue a final ruling.192
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 1364–65.
Id. (quoting QVD Food Co. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
Id. at 1365.
Pub. L. No. 114-27, §§ 501–507, 129 Stat. 362, 383–87 (2015).
§ 505(b) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)).
China Kingdom, 917 F.3d at 1365–66.
19 C.F.R. § 351.225(c) (2019).
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) (2012).
See 19 C.F.R. § 351.225.
§ 351.225(c)(1).
See § 351.225(c)(2).
§ 351.225(d)–(e).
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The Federal Circuit addressed one such scope ruling in the 2019
term, dealing with the case of “curtain wall units.”193 That case
originated with AD and CVD orders issued against aluminum extrusions
from the People’s Republic of China.194 Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum
Industry petitioned Commerce in 2013 to argue that the order does not
cover curtain wall units when imported under a contract for an entire
curtain wall.195 Applying its broad statutory discretion in scope
determinations, Commerce concluded that the subject merchandise
was not excluded from the AD/CVD orders.196 The CIT upheld
Commerce’s conclusion and the Federal Circuit agreed.197
Scope rulings are useful when it is unclear whether an imported
good falls within the language of an AD/CVD Order; however, because
petitions for scope rulings are presented to Commerce, CBP lacks the
authority to interpret ambiguous language in an AD/CVD Order. This
was clarified this term in Sunpreme Inc. v. United States.198 On January 7,
2020, the Federal Circuit granted a petition for rehearing en banc to
again address the scope of CBP’s authority and whether such a
“suspension may be continued following a scope inquiry by
Commerce.”199 The Federal Circuit reaffirmed its findings that
Commerce’s conclusion was valid.200
The AD/CVD Order (the “Order”) in question in this case involved
imported solar panels from China. The Order affected imported solar
modules utilizing crystalline silicon photovoltaic (CSPV) cells.201 The
Order excluded certain “thin film photovoltaic products.”202 After the
193. See Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 918 F.3d
1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
194. Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: Antidumping
Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650, 30,650 (May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions from
the People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653,
30,653 (May 26, 2011).
195. Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng’g Co., 918 F.3d at 1357–58.
196. Id. at 1358.
197. Id.
198. Sunpreme II CAFC, 924 F.3d 1198, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2019), vacated en banc, 946
F.3d 1300 (2020).
199. Sunpreme Inc. v. United States, 946 F.3d 1300, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (en banc).
200. Id. at 1322.
201. Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into
Modules, From the People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 77 Fed.
Reg. 73,017, 73,017 (Dec. 7, 2012); Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or
Not Assembled Into Modules, From the People’s Republic of China: Amended Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, and Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed.
Reg. 73,018, 73,018 (Dec. 7, 2012).
202. Sunpreme II CAFC, 924 F.3d at 1201.
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Order was published in 2012, Sunpreme imported its solar modules
under the entry type “01,” which indicated that it was not subject to the
Order.203 CBP did not object to this entry type until 2015, when CBP
sua sponte determined that the imported solar modules were in fact
subject to the Order and would thus be subject to a cash bond and a
suspension of liquidation.204
CBP was uncertain about the language in the Order, so it reached
out to Commerce to clarify the language in June 2015. Commerce
responded by informing CBP that the proper mechanism to determine
whether a good falls within an AD/CVD Order is for the importer to
file a request for a scope review.205 Sunpreme challenged CBP’s
determination at the CIT, and the CIT explained that the language in
the Order regarding what “thin film” means is ambiguous, but that it
is not within the authority of CBP to interpret that language.206 The
Federal Circuit reversed that decision on the grounds that the CIT
lacked jurisdiction to hear a direct challenge from CBP when another
administrative remedy—namely, a scope ruling—was available.207
Sunpreme went back to Commerce in 2015 to request a scope ruling,
which Commerce initiated in December 2015.208 In conducting a scope
ruling that requires interpretation of ambiguous language, Commerce
follows two sets of sources: the first set of sources includes the scope
language contained in the order itself, “[t]he descriptions contained
in the petition, the initial investigation, and the determinations of the
Secretary [of Commerce] (including prior scope determinations) and
the [ITC].”209 These are called the “(k)(1)” sources.210 If those sources
do not address the ambiguity in question, Commerce turns to the
(k)(2) sources, which include “the product’s physical characteristics,
ultimate purchasers’ expectations, the ultimate use of the product,
trade channels in which the product is sold, and the manner in which
the product is advertised and displayed.”211

203. Id. at 1202.
204. Id.
205. Sunpreme Inc. v. United States (“Sunpreme I CIT”), 190 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1192
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2016).
206. Id. at 1194–95.
207. See Sunpreme Inc. v. United States (“Sunpreme I CAFC”), 892 F.3d 1186, 1192–
94 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
208. Sunpreme II CAFC, 924 F.3d at 1203.
209. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1).
210. Sunpreme II CAFC, 924 F.3d at 1203.
211. Id.
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In this case, Commerce relied on the (k)(2) sources to conclude that
the Sunpreme solar modules, which were not clearly included but also
not clearly excluded from the AD/CVD Order, were in fact covered by
that Order.212 It found that the mere presence of thin film did not exclude
the modules from the Order, and that they functioned as other CSPV
modules, which were subject to the Order.213 Commerce instructed CBP
to continue suspending liquidation of the imported goods.214
Upon challenge by Sunpreme, the CIT concluded that Commerce
made a reasonable determination regarding the inclusion of the
imported solar modules within the AD/CVD Order.215 However, the CIT
also concluded that Commerce inappropriately ordered CBP to continue
suspending liquidation because that original suspension was ultra vires.216
Commerce only has the authority to continue a lawful suspension.217
The Federal Circuit, in upholding the CIT decision on both counts,
made very clear that the roles of Commerce and CBP in AD/CVD
investigations and determinations are quite distinct. While Commerce
has the authority to interpret, through scope rulings, whether certain
goods fall within its own orders, CBP has merely “ministerial duties” to
apply the determinations made by Commerce.218 “We also recognized
the superior institutional competence of Commerce over Customs for
antidumping and countervailing duty matters in Mitsubishi Electronics,
noting Customs’ merely ministerial duties, and holding that “Customs
cannot ‘modify . . . [Commerce’s] determinations, their underlying
facts, or their enforcement.’”219 The Federal Circuit further reasoned
that Commerce may only suspend liquidation of entries after a scope
inquiry has concluded, “and thus “retroactive authorization of
suspension of liquidation is prohibited.”220
It should be noted that this decision included extensive analysis by
the majority as well as a strong dissent regarding the cross-appeal by

212. Id. at 1204.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Sunpreme Inc. v. United States (“Sunpreme II CIT”), 256 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1276
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2017).
216. Id. at 1291–92, 1294.
217. Id. at 1293.
218. Sunpreme II CAFC, 924 F.3d at 1213.
219. Id.; see also id. at 1215 (“The scope inquiry in this case, answered by
Commerce’s interpretation of the duty order, proves beyond cavil that the duty order
here is ambiguous. Only at the conclusion of the scope inquiry could it be said that
Sunpreme’s solar modules fall within the scope of an ambiguous duty order.”).
220. Id. at 1213–14.
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the United States over the continuation of suspension of liquidation.221
The dissent agreed with the majority that CBP has only ministerial
duties whereas it is up to Commerce to interpret the Orders that it
issues.222 However, Judge Prost suggested that CBP has the authority to
examine imports and apply Orders as appropriate based upon their
own findings of fact,223 an interpretation that the Federal Circuit
dispelled in its recent en banc opinion.224 The dissenting opinion
continued to suggest that the majority opinion would incentivize
importers not to request scope inquiries where CBP is failing to apply
AD/CVD Orders to their goods.225
There are, of course, a multitude of ways in which an antidumping
order can be modified, such as through the five-year sunset review
process, a petition from an importer, or an order from the CIT. In the
case of BMW of North America LLC v. United States,226 which discussed
importing ball bearings from the United Kingdom, Commerce and the
CIT bounced back and forth over the need to maintain the Order
during the sunset review, ultimately terminating the Order, and then
reinstating it.227 This unusual process left BMW in the unfortunate
position of uncertainty over whether it was subject to an Order
affecting its imports.
The BMW case began with a May 2011 request for administrative
reviews of a 1989 AD/CVD Order on ball bearing imports from France,
Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, posted by
Commerce.228 BMW timely submitted a request for review.229 At the
same time, the same Order was undergoing a five-year sunset review.230
The sunset review resulted in the ITC finding a continuation of
material injury to a domestic industry and thus maintaining a domestic
injury. The CIT, however, vacated and remanded that decision several
times between 2006 and 2011, ultimately leading the ITC to determine
that there would likely not be a material injury if the Order were
221. See id. at 1216 (Prost, C.J., dissenting in part).
222. Id. at 1218–19.
223. See id. (citing Xerox Corp. v. United States, 289 F.3d 792, 794 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
224. Sunpreme Inc. v. United States, 946 F.3d 1300, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (en banc).
225. Sunpreme II CAFC, 924 F.3d at 1219.
226. 926 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
227. Id. at 1291, 1294–95.
228. Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order, Finding, or Suspended
Investigation; Opportunity to Request Administrative Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,460,
24,460 (May 2, 2011).
229. BMW, 926 F.3d at 1294.
230. Id. at 1294.
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discontinued.231 Commerce published notice in the Federal Register
of the termination of the AD Order and notified parties with pending
administrative reviews that those reviews would be “discontinue[d].”232
The Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s decision that led to the
termination of the Order in 2013 and, thus, reinstated the Order.233
Accordingly, Commerce electronically notified all of the parties that
had previously submitted administrative review requests and asked
them to submit a quantity and value questionnaire to determine the
most applicable and appropriate dumping margin.234 BMW did not
respond, arguing later that the time lapse and confusion over the
existence of the Order left it unaware that it was required to respond.235
Ultimately, Commerce applied an adverse facts available rate, which is
utilized when an importer subject to an administrative review fails to
respond to a request for information. The failure to respond led
Commerce to determine a rate on its own, which tends to be a higher
rate than would otherwise have been applied.
D. Liquidation of Entries
The CBP’s final act in settling its accounts for imports subject to
antidumping or countervailing duty orders is liquidation, whereby the
final rate that has been established is applied to the entries and
charged to the importer.236 Assuming no adjustments are made along
the way, liquidation usually happens at the estimated duty amount that
the importer initially paid to receive their goods.237
However, when goods are subject to an antidumping or countervailing
duty order, or otherwise stuck in litigation, liquidation often takes place
long after the goods arrive at the port of entry.238 While these legal
challenges work their way up and down the courts, the goods are released
to the importer, who pays estimated duties on those goods.239 If the
liquidated amount is higher than the estimated duties, the importer is
231. Id.
232. Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from Japan and the United Kingdom:
Revocation of Antidumping Duty Orders, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,761, 41,762 (July 15, 2011).
233. NSK Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 716 F.3d 1352, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
234. BMW, 926 F.3d at 1295.
235. Id. at 1295–96.
236. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-542, ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES: CBP ACTION NEEDED TO REDUCE DUTY PROCESSING ERRORS
AND MITIGATE NONPAYMENT RISK 6–7 (2016).
237. Id. at 7.
238. Id. at 7 n.18.
239. Id. at 6.
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billed for the difference. Likewise, if the liquidated amount is lower,
the importer will receive a refund of duties paid.
While undergoing an AD/CVD investigation, if Commerce or a
court decides to adjust the duty rate under an existing AD/CVD order,
they are required by law to issue a Timken240 notice, alerting the party
that the duty rate will change.241 That notice must be issued within ten
days of a court decision to change the duty amount.242 The new duty
may not be applied retroactively; however, all entries of goods after the
date of the Timken notice are subject to the new duty rate.
The case of Sumecht NA, Inc. v. United States243 challenged some
aspects of these notices.244 This case addressed an antidumping duty
order on crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells imported from China.245
Note that a parallel case, relevant here, addressed countervailing duties
on these same imports.246 In Commerce’s 2012 final antidumping
determination for these imports, it established a China-wide rate of
249.96%, but gave Sumecht, d/b/a Sumec, a separate rate of 24.48%,
which was later lowered to 13.18% due to a World Trade Organization
decision.247 Commerce’s determination was challenged and, following a
voluntary remand, Commerce decided that Sumec no longer qualified for
a separate rate due to a concern for consistency with recent rulings.248
As noted above, any time the courts decide to change an existing
duty rate, Commerce must issue a Timken notice to make the parties
aware of the change. This notice must be issued within ten days of that
court decision. In this case, Commerce issued their notice forty-nine
days after the CIT’s decision in Jiangsu Jiasheng,249 which mandated the

240. Timken Co. v. United States, 893 F.2d 337 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
241. Id. at 341.
242. Id.
243. Sumecht NA, Inc. v. United States, 923 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
244. Id. at 1344.
245. Id. at 1343.
246. Id. at 1346.
247. See Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into
Modules, from the People’s Republic of China: Amended Final Determination of Sales
at Less Than Fair Value, and Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,018, 73,021
(Dec. 7, 2012); Implementation of Determinations Under section 129 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 48,812, 48,818 (Aug. 14, 2015).
248. Jiangsu Jiasheng Photovoltaic Tech. Co. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 1263,
1267 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015).
249. Sumecht, 923 F.3d at 1344.
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redetermination of the rate for Sumec.250 Commerce retroactively
dated that notice with the date of October 15, 2015, and instructed
CBP to begin liquidating entries for the period October 15 through
November 23, 2015. Sumec challenged that decision on the grounds
that the Timken notice had not been properly issued.251
Sumec sought a preliminary injunction to prevent CBP from
liquidating entries for the subject period at the higher duty rate. A
court will grant a preliminary injunction if the movant can show “(1)
likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm absent
immediate relief, (3) the balance of interests weighing in favor of relief,
and (4) that the injunction serves the public interest.”252 The CIT
previously denied Sumec’s motion on the ground that it had not shown
the likelihood of irreparable harm since the liquidation had already
been enjoined in the parallel countervailing duty case.253 The Federal
Circuit agreed and found no reason to depart from this decision.254
It should be noted that, subsequent to this decision, the case
returned to the CIT for a hearing on the merits of the improper Timken
notice.255 In that case, Judge Choe-Groves opined that Commerce is
required to issue the Timken notice within ten days of the court
decision adjusting duty rates; that Commerce may not remedy a late
notice by making such notice retroactive; and that Commerce
retroactively increasing the duty amount is not harmless error.256 While
that decision is likely to be appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals, it would appear as of the time of this writing that Commerce may
be held to a higher standard when issuing Timken notices in the future.

250. Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules,
From the People’s Republic of China: Notice of Court Decision Not in Harmony with Final
Determination of Investigation and Amended Final Determination of Investigation Pursuant
to Court Decision, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,950, 72,950 (Nov. 23, 2015).
251. Sumecht, 923 F.3d at 1344.
252. Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
253. Sumecht, 923 F.3d at 1346.
254. Id. at 1347.
255. Sumecht NA, Inc. v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1372 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019).
256. Id. at 1377, 1379.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
A significant number of trade cases at the Federal Circuit this year
involved classification issues. And of those, several revolved around the
proper definition of the good, from door knobs to passenger vans. The
Federal Circuit emphasized, once again, the difference between eo
nomine and use definitions of objects. The former refers to a
commonly understood object—such as a wrench—that is defined by
its name rather than its intended use. A “use” definition, on the other
hand, is best understood as an object that is defined by how it is
intended to be used. The difference was highlighted by two cases this
term: Irwin, which classified wrenches and pliers as eo nomine regardless
of their final intended use.257 On the other hand, in the Ford case, the
Federal Circuit found that when use is implied in a common term, such
as cargo van, that use should be examined when classifying the good.258
In the dumping arena, a variety of issues were covered this year, from
the proper determination of country of origin and Commerce’s
discretion in making that determination259 to the ability of Commerce
to reinstate an AD/CVD order that it had discontinued.260 One of the
key cases in this area this year was the China Kingdom case, which
involved the selection of a surrogate country to assess financial
statements in a case involving a nonmarket economy.261 In that case,
the Federal Circuit concluded that Commerce had broad discretion to
choose where to source its information in dumping determinations
involving nonmarket economies.262
The forthcoming term at the Federal Circuit will likely be even more
contentious as the court tackles an appeal over the use of section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to block the entry of steel and
aluminum imports under the auspice of national security.263 This
important case questions the ability of Congress to delegate its trade
257. Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. United States, 920 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
258. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 926 F.3d 741, 751, 753 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(leading the Federal Circuit to reverse the CIT and remand to examine the ultimate
use of imported vans).
259. Canadian Solar Inc. v. United States, 918 F.3d 910, 918 (finding that
Commerce has broad discretion to depart from normal practices).
260. BMW of N. Am. LLC v. United States, 926 F.3d 1291, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding
that Commerce has broad discretion to reinstate orders that had been discontinued).
261. Weishan Hongda Aquatic Food Co. v. United States (China Kingdom), 917 F.3d
1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
262. Id. at 1364–65.
263. Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1337 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2019).
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powers to the President and whether doing so violates the
nondelegation doctrine. The CIT upheld the authority of Congress to
make such a delegation on the basis of precedent established by the
1976 Algonquin case.264 However, the judges in the CIT decision
questioned the validity of that precedent given the current application
of section 232 tariffs.265 It will be up to the Federal Circuit to determine
the validity of that delegation, and it will likely do so during the 2019
to 2020 term. Stay tuned.

264. Id. at 1340 (citing Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548,
559–60 (1976)).
265. Id. at 1346–47.

